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Abstract
This paper studies the welfare e⁄ects of third-degree price discrimination
under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product di⁄erentiation. We
derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for price discrimination to improve
social welfare: the degree of substitution must be su¢ ciently greater in the
￿strong￿market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform
price) than in the ￿weak￿market (where it is lower). It is veri￿ed, however,
that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely due
to an increase in the ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
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Product di⁄erentiation is one of the main reasons why ￿rms can enjoy market power;
it enables them to sell products that are no longer perfect substitutes. For example,
Coca Cola and PepsiCo sell similar types of soda, though it is arguable that they
di⁄er in taste. Each ￿rm thereby attracts some consumers over another. It is often
the case that ￿rms￿di⁄erentiation of their products leads consumers to value the
variety. Examples of complementary products abound and include such products as
￿breakfast cereal and milk￿and ￿cars and petrol.￿
If ￿rms have some control over the price that consumers pay, they naturally
want to take advantage of it. Third-degree price discrimination is one marketing
technique that is widely used in imperfectly competitive markets. In third-degree
price discrimination, the seller uses identi￿able signals (e.g., age, gender, location,
and time of use) to categorize buyers into di⁄erent segments or submarkets, each
of which is given a constant price per unit. Behind the recent trend toward third-
degree price discrimination is rapid progress in information-processing technology,
notably including the widespread use of the Internet in the past two decades.1
This paper examines the welfare e⁄ects of oligopolistic third-degree price dis-
crimination, explicitly considering product di⁄erentiation as a source of market
power and strategic interaction. In a story related to the example in the ￿rst para-
graph, the New York Times once reported (October 28, 1999)2 that Coca Cola was
testing a vending machine that would automatically raise prices in hot weather. Al-
though the article triggered nationwide controversy and Coca Cola had to abandon
the project as a result, the plan could have changed the regime of uniform pricing
to one of price discrimination in the soda market. How would the resulting change
a⁄ect consumer welfare and ￿rms￿pro￿ts? In other words, is third-degree price dis-
crimination is good or bad? Answering this question is important because it helps
antitrust authorities to evaluate price discrimination in two important characteris-
1See Shy (2008) concerning how advances in the information technology have made ￿ ￿ne-tailored￿
pricing tactics more practicable for sellers.
2http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/28/business/variable-price-coke-machine-being-
tested.html (retrived December 2011)
1tics of market: oligopoly and product di⁄erentiation.
In this paper, we focus on horizontal product di⁄erentiation to consider sub-
stitutability as well as complementarity.3 By assuming a linear-quadratic utility
function of a representative consumer and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium of
a pricing game, we characterize the conditions relating to such demand properties as
substitutability and complementarity required for price discrimination to improve
social welfare. More speci￿cally, we derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be
su¢ ciently greater in the ￿strong￿market (where the discriminatory price is higher
than the uniform price) than in the ￿weak￿market (where it is lower). It is also
shown that aggregate output must increase for price discrimination to improve so-
cial welfare. We verify, however, that consumer surplus is never improved by price
discrimination: welfare improvement from price discrimination is solely due to an
increase in ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
Why does allowing price discrimination improve social welfare? Notice that
there are two forces that determinine equilibrium prices in price-setting oligopoly:
a larger market size raises the price, while a larger substitutability parameter low-
ers the price. For price discrimination to raise social welfare, it is necessary that
a high degree of substitutability mitigates an increase in the discriminatory price
in the larger market. Therefore, although the price rises with discrimination in
this market, the market size e⁄ect is not signi￿cant. The welfare gain in the weak
market outweighs the welfare loss in the strong market when an increase in the
discriminatory price in the strong market is kept low.
Since Pigou￿ s (1920) seminal work, the central question in the analysis of third-
degree price discrimination is about its welfare e⁄ects: what are the e⁄ects of third-
degree price discrimination on consumer surplus and Marshallian social welfare (the
sum of consumer surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts)? In the literature, however, little has
3With horizontal product di⁄erentiation, some consumers prefer product A to B while others
prefer B to A. On the other hand, vertical product di⁄erentiation captures the situation where all
consumers agree on the ranking of products. See, for example, Belle￿ amme and Peitz (2010, Ch.5)
for further discussion of its distinction.
2been reported about the welfare e⁄ects of oligopolistic third-degree price discrimina-
tion since the publication of a seminal paper by Holmes (1989), which analyzes the
output e⁄ects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly, but not the welfare
e⁄ects.4 On the other hand, the welfare e⁄ects of monopolistic third-degree price
discrimination are relatively well known. Since the work by Robinson (1933), it has
been well known that when all submarkets are served under uniform pricing,5 price
discrimination must decrease social welfare unless aggregate output increases. This
implies that an increase in aggregate output is a necessary condition for social welfare
to be improved by third-degree price discrimination.6 In particular, price discrimi-
nation necessarily decreases social welfare if demands are linear because aggregate
output remains constant.7 The welfare consequences of oligopolistic third-degree
price discrimination, however, remain largely unknown. It is therefore important to
study oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination, because only a small number
of goods are supplied by monopolists in the real world and an increasing number of
￿rms use price discrimination for their products and services.
This paper investigates the relationship between product di⁄erentiation and
change in social welfare associated with the regime change from uniform pricing
4See Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007) for comprehensive surveys of price discrimination with
imperfect competition, and Liu and Serfes (2010) for a brief survey. In contrast to Holmes￿(1989)
focus on a symmetric Nash equilibrium (where all ￿rms behave identically), an important work by
Corts (1998) relaxes the requirement for symmetry to show that asymmetry in ￿rms￿best response
functions is necessary for unambiguous welfare e⁄ects (when prices drop in all markets, the result is
unambiguous welfare improvement, and when these prices jump, the result is unambiguous welfare
deterioration). Our focus on a symmetric equilibrium is based on the assumption that all ￿rms
agree in their ranking in pricing (see Stole (2007) for details), and is motivated by our recognition
that this situation is more natural than the asymmetric cases in many examples of third-price
discrimination.
5Under uniform pricing, ￿rms may be better o⁄ by refusing supply to some submarkets. See,
for example, Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) regarding this issue.
6Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) o⁄er a comprehensive analysis, ￿nding su¢ cient conditions
relating the curvatures of direct and indirect demand functions in separate markets. While they
allow nonlinear demand functions, they, like many researchers, restrict an endogenous event: all
markets are simply assumed to be open. Cowan (2007) o⁄ers a similar analysis by restricting a
class of demand functions.
7For example, Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), Schwartz (1990), and Bertoletti (2004). In
contrast to these studies, Adachi (2002, 2005) shows that, when there are consumption externalities,
price discrimination can increase social welfare even if aggregate output remains the same (see also
Ikeda and Nariu (2009) and Okada and Adachi (2011)). Ikeda and Toshimitsu (2010) show that if
quality is endogenously chosen, price discrimination necessarily improves social welfare.
3to price discrimination when all submarkets are open under uniform pricing.8 To
model price competition with product di⁄erentiation, we adopt the Chamberlin-
Robinson approach (named by Vives (1999, p.243)): a ￿representative￿consumer
(i.e., a virtual individual that is an aggregation of an in￿nitesimal number of identi-
cal consumers) is assumed to value the variety of goods. In this paper, we consider
the (fully parameterized) linear demand structure to obtain an explicit solution as
well as an explicit condition for all submarkets to be open under uniform pricing.
The bene￿t of this speci￿cation is that we do not have to simply assume such en-
dogenous events as a market opening. In addition, while Holmes (1989) assumes
substitutability of products, our formulation allows inclusion of complementarity in
a welfare analysis.
One important di⁄erence between monopoly and oligopoly is that in a monopoly,
the price elasticity of demand in each submarket has a one-to-one relationship with
the optimal discriminatory price: the larger the price elasticity, the lower the dis-
criminatory price is. In oligopoly, however, this may not be the case because strategic
interaction a⁄ects the pricing decision of each ￿rm. In particular, the price elasticity
that a ￿rm faces in a discriminatory market is generally di⁄erent from the elastic-
ity that the ￿rms as a whole (i.e., in a collusive oligopoly) face. In this paper, we
show that in equilibrium this ￿￿rm-level￿price elasticity has a simple expression in
terms of product di⁄erentiation. More speci￿cally, it is veri￿ed that, as in Holmes
(1989), in equilibrium the ￿rm-level price elasticity decomposes into ￿market-level￿
and ￿strategic-related￿elasticity (the precise meanings are given in the text). The
latter elasticity simply coincides with the degree of product di⁄erentiation.9 It is
observed from numerical and graphical analysis that this ￿strategic￿elasticity plays
8In a similar study of third-degree price discrimination in price-setting oligopoly, Dastidar
(2006), by focusing on symmetric Nash equilibrium, as Holmes (1989) and this paper do, pro-
vides su¢ cient conditions for output, pro￿t and welfare to be higher or lower under discrimination
than under uniform pricing. Our study complements Dastidar￿ s (2006) analysis in the sense that
while Dastidar (2006) utilizes such endogenous objects as price di⁄erentials in each submarket in
characterizing the conditions, ours explicitly takes into account such demand properties as sub-
stitutability and complementarity to characterize the conditions under which price discrimination
improves social welfare.
9Our analysis below shows that Holmes￿(1989) decomposition also holds for the case of com-
plementarity with linear demands in the speci￿cation of our paper.
4an important role in the determination of discriminatory prices and social welfare.
One bene￿t of using linear demands is that we can evaluate welfare without the
complications associated with demand concavity/convexity. In particular, whether
a change in aggregate output by price discrimination is positive is simply expressed
only by the parameters of product di⁄erentiation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model
and preliminary results. Section 3 presents the welfare analysis. Section 4 concludes
the paper. Technical arguments are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we ￿rst set up the model and then provide the preliminary results
necessary for the welfare analysis in the next section.
2.1 Setup
Firms produce (horizontally) di⁄erentiated products and compete in price10 to sell
their products (directly) to consumers. A ￿rm sells only one type of product, which
can therefore also be interpreted as a brand. Markets are partitioned according to
identi￿able signals (e.g., location, time of use, age, and gender).11 The quali￿er
￿horizontally￿denotes that ￿rms di⁄erentiate by targeting consumer heterogeneity
in taste rather than quality. For simplicity, we assume that all ￿rms have the
same constant marginal cost, c ￿ 0. Resale among consumers must be impossible,
10Stole (2008, pp.2233-4) argues that if quantity (Cournot) competition is considered, third-
degree price discrimination does not change aggregate output when demands are linear (and when
all markets are served). This is reminiscent of the result in the case of monopoly (see Introduction),
and it results from the fact that Cournot competition is a ￿generalization￿of monopoly to strategic
situations. For example, Neven and Phlips (1985) consider a duopoly model of quantity competition
with homogenous products, linear demands, and quadratic costs, in the context of international
trade (transportation costs between submarkets are considered), and show that social welfare is
always lower under price discrimination. Cheng and Wang (1997) derive the same result by allowing
di⁄erent costs among ￿rms. We thank Iæaki Aguirre and Simon Cowan for this point.
11There are no interdependencies between separate markets. Layson (1998) and Adachi (2002)
study the welfare e⁄ects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination in the presence of inter-
dependencies.
5otherwise some consumers would be better o⁄buying the good at a lower price from
other consumers (arbitrage).
Following Robinson (1933) and most subsequent papers in the literature, we
suppose that the whole market is divided into two subgroups: ￿strong￿and ￿weak￿
markets. Loosely put, a strong (weak) market is a ￿larger￿(￿smaller￿ ) market.12
Consumer preference in market m 2 fs;wg (s denotes (the set of) the strong markets

























where j￿mj < ￿m denotes the degree of horizontal product di⁄erentiation in market
m, qj
m is the amount of consumption/output produced by ￿rm j for market m
(j 2 fA;Bg), and ￿m > 0.13 Notice that this speci￿cation allows the cross-partial
derivative to be expressed by just one parameter: @Um=@qA
m@qB
m = ￿￿m. If ￿m > 0,
the goods in market m are called substitutes. On the other hand, they are called
complements if ￿m < 0. If ￿m = 0, they are independent.
Notice that the direction of the sign is associated with the usual de￿nitions of
complementarity/substitutability: when the ￿rms￿goods are substitutes (comple-
ments), the marginal utility from consuming an additional unit of the good pur-
chased from one ￿rm is lower (higher) when a consumer consumes more units of
the good from the other ￿rms. Note that the lower the value of ￿m, the more dif-
ferentiated ￿rms￿products are.14 The ratio ￿m=￿m 2 (￿1;1) is interpreted as a
(normalized) measure of horizontal product di⁄erentiation in market m (see Belle-
12More precisely, following the literature, we de￿ne a strong (weak) market as one in which
the price is increased (decreased) by price discrimination. Notice that this de￿nition is based
on an ￿equilibrium￿ result from optimizing behavior (either in monopoly or oligopolistic pricing).
Appendices A1 and A2 show the parametric restrictions by which a market is strong or weak in
the model presented below.
13More precisely, we assume that the utility function has a quasi-linear form of Um(qA
m;qB
m)+q0,
where q0 is the ￿composite￿good (produced by the competitive sector) whose (competitive) price
is normalized at one. Thus, there are no income e⁄ects on the determination of demands in the
markets that are focused, validating partial equilibrium analysis. This quadratic utility function is
a standard one that justi￿es linear demands (see Vives (1999, p.145), for example). Here, symmetry
between ￿rms is additionally imposed.
14In the case of independence in market m (￿m = 0), each ￿rm behaves as a monopolist of its
own brand. Hence, the results from studies of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination with
linear demands apply.
6￿ amme and Peitz (2010, p.65)). The greater ￿m=￿m, the greater the degree of
substitution is (interpreting complementarity as negative substitutability). As we
see in Section 3, ￿m=￿m plays an important role in interpreting the equilibrium
prices, outputs and social welfare under price discrimination.
Note also that it is assumed that ￿m can vary across submarkets. This setting
is not unnatural in the context of horizontal product di⁄erentiation. For example,
a consumer may care less about brands in summer bay resorts (where temperature
is high) than in urban areas. In another case where submarkets are separated by
seniority, elderly consumers may care less about brands.
Utility maximization by the representative consumer yields the inverse demand
function for ￿rm j in each market m, pj
m(qj
m;q￿j
m ) = ￿m ￿ ￿mqj
m ￿ ￿mq￿j
m . The
demand functions in market m are thus given by
8
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where ￿m ￿ ￿m=￿m. Notice here that the symmetry in ￿rms￿demands, qA
m(p0;p00) =
qB
m(p00;p0). As stated above, we follow Holmes (1989) and many others to focus on a
symmetric Nash equilibrium where all ￿rms set the same price in one market.15 With
little abuse of notation, let qm(p) = qA
m(p;p). For a simpler exposition, there are
two ￿rms and two discriminatory markets. These numbers can be arbitrary and the
results presented below hold as long as we focus on a symmetric Nash equilibrium.



























15See Corts (1998) for interesting issues that arise from the asymmetric equilibrium.
7We measure social e¢ ciency by this aggregate social welfare. We can also de￿ne
























































































We consider two regimes, uniform pricing (r = U) and price discrimination
(r = D): under uniform pricing, ￿rms set a common unit price for all separate
markets. Under price discrimination, they can set a di⁄erent price in each market.
Throughout this paper, we restrict our attention to the case where all markets are
served under both regimes.






















we know that under symmetry, the symmetric equilibrium price under uniform pric-

















while the equilibrium prices in market m under price discrimination, p￿
m, are deter-













8Again, one caveat here is the well-known problem in the literature concerning
third-degree price discrimination: under uniform pricing, when a market is su¢ -
ciently small, it may not be served by either ￿rm. While many papers in the liter-
ature simply assume that all markets are open under uniform pricing, we provide
a more speci￿c structure in the next subsection to guarantee this and to proceed
further the analysis.
2.2 Best Response Functions





m ) be ￿rm j￿ s best response function in market
m under price discrimination, given ￿rm k￿ s price in market m, pk
m. Corts (1998)
makes four assumptions concerning the pro￿t functions and the best response func-
tions. In our settings, Assumptions 1 and 3 in Corts (1998) are satis￿ed,17 although
Assumption 2, which assumes strategic complementarity, is violated. This is because












m ) ￿ (pj ￿ c)qj
m(pj;p￿j
m ), is positive, while in our setting it is equal
to ￿m, and it can be negative (i.e., strategic substitutability) if the ￿rms￿products
are complements.18 Assumption 4 in Corts (1998), which guarantees that a ￿rm￿ s
best response functions never cross (i.e., BRj
m(p￿j) > BR
j
￿m(p￿j) 8p￿j), does not
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16We are grateful to Hajime Sugeta for this point.
17Assumption 1 in Corts (1998) ensures the uniqueness of the best response, and Assumption 3
the equilibrium stability.






















Here, ￿rm j￿ s best response curve in submarket m under price discrimination is
upward sloping (resp. downward sloping) if the ￿rms￿ products are substitutes
(resp. complements). If ￿s 6= ￿w, then the two curves can cross as Figure 1 depicts
(Es corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium price in the strong market, Es to
the equilibrium price in the weak market, and U to the equilibrium price under
uniform pricing). This occurs if and only if ￿s=￿w < (1￿￿w)=(1￿￿s). In this sense,
our model speci￿cation puts fewer restrictions (except linearity) on the economic
fundamentals than Corts￿(1998) study does.
102.3 Solutions and Preliminary Results














from (1) and that qm(p) = (￿m ￿ p)=(￿m + ￿m) is the symmetric demand function,






and from (2) the equilibrium uniform price is
p
￿ =










under the regime of uniform pricing (where ￿ ￿ (￿s;￿w), ￿ ￿ (￿s;￿w) and ￿ ￿
(￿s;￿w)) if both markets are open. See Appendix A1 for derivation of the associated
output in each market under price discrimination and under uniform pricing. Ap-
pendix A2 shows that the weak market must be su¢ ciently large for neither ￿rm to
have an incentive to deviate to close it. It must also be small enough for the strong
market to remain strong (i.e., the equilibrium prices under price discrimination are
higher than under uniform pricing; see Footnote 12). Thus, we restrict the relative
size in intercepts, ￿w=￿s 2 (￿w=￿s;￿w=￿s). These upper and lower bounds are
functions of ￿ and ￿, and their precise expressions are given in Appendix A2.20
Notice that @p￿
m=@(￿m=￿m) = ￿￿m=[2 ￿ (￿m=￿m)]2 < 0, which implies that as
￿m=￿m becomes larger the discriminatory prices decreases. In addition, the uni-
form price and the discriminatory prices converge to the marginal cost because
lime ￿m"1 p￿
m = 0 = lim￿m"min(￿m) p￿ for all m.
19Notice the innocuousness of the zero marginal cost assumption: it is equivalent to assuming a
constant marginal cost if prices and consumers￿willingness to pay are interpreted as the net cost
(interpreting it as ￿m ￿ c as ￿m).
20The ￿weak￿market is smaller than the ￿strong￿market in the sense that the marginal will-





m) = (0;0) is greater in the strong market.
113 Welfare Analysis
This section consists of two subsections. The ￿rst subsection presents analytical
properties that are useful for welfare analysis. We then investigate the welfare
e⁄ects of price discrimination in the second subsection.
3.1 Analytical Properties
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m = qm(p￿) are the equilibrium quantities in market
m under the regimes of price discrimination and of uniform pricing, respectively
(see Appendix A1 for the actual functional forms). Let ￿SW ￿ be de￿ned by the
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m. It is further shortened, and thus we have the following lemma
(see Appendix A3 for a proof):















This expression has the following graphical interpretation. Figure 2 shows the
relationship between ￿p￿
m and ￿q￿
m. As Appendix A1 demonstrates, we have ￿p￿
m =
￿(￿m + ￿m)￿q￿
m. This relationship can be interpreted as the situation where in
12symmetric equilibrium any ￿rm faces the ￿virtual￿inverse demand function, pm =




m ) = ￿m ￿ ￿mqj
m ￿ ￿mq￿j
m ). Notice that the ￿virtual￿
inverse demand function is not de￿ned in the whole domain of qm except for the bold
part of the curve: more precisely, it is de￿ned only on the equilibrium points (for
uniform pricing and for price discrimination). The welfare change in market m is
depicted by the shaded trapezoid in Figure 2 (in this example, it is a welfare gain).
Thus, its size is calculated by the sum of the upper and bottom segments (p￿
m +p￿)
multiplied by height (￿q￿
m = ￿￿p￿
m=(￿m + ￿m)), divided by two. Noting that two
identical ￿rms exist in market m, we have ￿￿p￿
m(p￿
m + p￿)=(￿m + ￿m) as a welfare
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Changes in Quantity and Price in Market m (for any ￿rm)
If it is positive (when ￿p￿
m < 0), then it is a welfare gain. Similarly, if it is
negative (when ￿p￿
m > 0), then it is a welfare loss. Other things being equal, the
greater the value of ￿m (more substitutable) the steeper (and hence less elastic) the
equilibrium inverse demand curve becomes.
We have the following property of the price elasticity under price discrimination.
A simple calculation leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let the equilibrium price elasticity of demand in market m under price
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where qm(p￿
m) = (￿m ￿ p￿
m)=(￿m + ￿m). Then, it is expressed by
"m(p
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m) is a constant, and does not depend on either qD
m or even the
intercept, ￿m. This decomposition is a special result of Holmes￿(1989, p.246) general
result: ￿rm-level elasticity is the sum of the market elasticity and the cross-price
elasticity.21
The market elasticity of demand is a unit-free measure of responsiveness of the
￿rms as a whole. However, strategic interaction distinguishes it from the elasticity on
which each ￿rm bases its decision making: the cross-price elasticity measures of how
much each ￿rm ￿damages￿the other ￿rm in equilibrium. In our model, strategic
interaction is created by the very fact that ￿rms (horizontally) di⁄erentiate their
products or services. Notice that the market elasticity is exactly one as in the case
of a one-good monopoly with a linear demand curve (remember that price elasticity
of demand is one when the marginal revenue curve crosses the constant marginal
cost curve (i.e., the horizontal axis)).
As we mention in Section 2, the ratio ￿m=￿m 2 (￿1;1) is interpreted as the
normalized measure of horizontal product di⁄erentiation in market m. The cross-
price elasticity in Holmes (1989) is simply expressed by the negative of the ratio
alone. From (4), we have the relationship, "m(p￿
m) S 1 if and only if ￿m R 0. That
is, if the brands are substitutes (￿m > 0), then the ￿rm-level elasticity in equilibrium
is less than one, meaning that raising the price by one percent (as joint decision)
creates a less than one percent decrease in its demand, and thus an increase in
revenue (hence in pro￿t). On the other hand, a one percent price cut creates more
21Holmes (1989) shows the decomposition under the assumption of symmetric demands between
￿rms: it also holds o⁄ equilibrium. The term ￿market elasticity￿is borrowed from Stole (2007)
(Holmes (1989) originally called it the ￿industry-demand elasticity￿ ).
14than a one percent increase in its demand if the brands are complements (￿m < 0).
These facts imply that substitutability (resp. complementarity) in market m keeps
the equilibrium prices relatively low (resp. high).
As to changes in equilibrium aggregate output, ￿Q￿ (see Appendix A1 for
the derivation), it is shown that if the aggregate output is not increased by price
discrimination, then social welfare deteriorates (i.e., ￿Q￿ ￿ 0 ) ￿SW ￿ < 0),
as veri￿ed by Bertoletti (2004) in the case of monopoly with linear and nonlinear
demands22 and by Dastidar (2006, p.244) in the case of oligopoly with linear and
nonlinear demands (see Appendix A4 for the derivation in our settings).
Given that market s is strong (￿s=￿w > ￿s=￿w), we have the following relation-
ship:
￿Q











which is a special case of Holmes￿(1989) result that includes nonlinear demands.23
Notice that, as Dasidar (2006, p.240) also points out, shifting from uniform pricing
to price discrimination can increase aggregate output under oligopoly with linear
demands while under monopoly, it remains constant.
Holmes (1989, p.247) shows that a change in the aggregate output resulting
from price discrimination is positive if and only if the sum of the two terms, the
￿adjusted-concavity condition￿and ￿elasticity-ratio condition￿ , is positive. As its
name implies, the ￿rst term is related to the demand curvature, and in our case of
linear demands, it is zero. The second term is written as
cross-price elasticity in market s
market elasticity in market s
￿
cross-price elasticity in market w
market elasticity in market w
,
which is equivalent to ￿s=￿s ￿￿w=￿w from Lemma 1. If this is positive, a change in
the aggregate output is positive. This is consistent with the relationship mentioned
above. We can understand this relationship by focusing on the elasticities: "s(p￿
s) <
"w(p￿
w) means that an increase in discriminatory price takes place in the market
22Bertoletti￿ s (2004) result is a generalization of the well-known result of Varian (1985) and
Schwartz (1990) who state that ￿Q￿ < 0 ) ￿SW￿ < 0.
23Aguirre (2011) points out that Footnote 6 of Holmes (1989) is incorrect: his analysis does not
apply to the family of constant elasticity demand functions.
15where it creates more revenue, and that a decrease in discriminatory price takes
place in the market where it doesn￿ t. Notice also that the relationship, together
with Proposition 2, implies that the degree of substitution must be larger in the
strong market than in the weak market for a positive change in social welfare.
There are two sources of an increase in aggregate output: one is a large increase in
the weak market, and the other is a small decrease in the strong market. Noting
the equilibrium discriminatory price in market m is a decreasing function of ￿m=￿m
(see subsection 2.2), ￿s=￿s > ￿w=￿w means that the latter e⁄ect must be small,
and thus the degree of substitution must be larger in the strong, rather than the
weak, market. The result that the output change, ￿Q￿, can be positive in oligopoly
is in sharp contrast with the case in monopoly where the output change is always
zero with linear demand.24 In the next subsection, we explore the possibility of
￿SW ￿ > 0 in the di⁄erentiated oligopoly. However, a positive change in social
welfare is solely due to an improvement in the ￿rms￿pro￿ts. This is because a
change in aggregate consumer surplus is always negative. Let ￿CS￿ be de￿ned
by the equilibrium di⁄erence between aggregate consumer surpluses under price
discrimination and under uniform pricing (CSD￿CSU). We then have the following
result (see Appendix A5 for the proof).
Proposition 1. Price discrimination always deteriorates aggregate consumer sur-
plus (i.e., ￿CS￿ < 0 for all exogenous parameters).
3.2 Welfare-Improving Price Discrimination
We now explore the possibility of ￿SW ￿(￿;￿;￿) > 0. To proceed further, we now
reduce the number of the parameters. More speci￿cally, we assume that ￿s = 1 >
￿w > 0. This is because price discrimination never improves welfare if ￿s = ￿w (the
formal proof is available upon request). Thus, ￿s=￿w > 1 is necessary for social
welfare to improve. In the following analysis, we ￿rst consider the case of symmetry
in product di⁄erentiation in the strong and weak markets (￿s=￿s = ￿w=￿w). We then
24Dastidar (2006, p.240) also points out this di⁄erence in price-setting models of oligopoly (see
also Footnote 10).
16allow asymmetric product di⁄erentiation. To do so, we ￿rst construct an intuitive
argument why price discrimination improves social welfare. Given the equilibrium
discriminatory price is higher (lower) than the uniform price in the strong (weak)















For the latter inequality to hold, (1) ￿q￿
w or (p￿+p￿
w) is su¢ ciently large, and/or
(2) j￿q￿
sj or (p￿ + p￿
s) is su¢ ciently small. Figure 3 shows the asymmetry between
the strong and the weak markets. Notice that the upper segment of the trapezoid of
the welfare loss in the strong market and the bottom segment of the trapezoid of the
welfare gain in the weak market have the same length (p￿). Thus, the larger j￿q￿
sj,
the larger (p￿ + p￿
s) is. On the other hand, the larger ￿q￿
w, the smaller (p￿ + p￿
w) is.
Hence, the smaller j￿q￿
sj, the better it is for welfare improvement, while ￿q￿
w should
not be too small or too large.
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Figure 3: Asymmetry between the Strong and the Weak Markets
Lastly, we consider the relationship between ￿SW ￿ and ￿￿￿. Remember that
an increase in aggregate output is necessary for price discrimination to improve
social welfare. It is shown that its necessary condition is an increase in pro￿t (i.e.,
17￿SW ￿ > 0 ) ￿Q￿ > 0 ) ￿￿￿ > 0; see Appendix A6 for the veri￿cation).
It means that whenever price discrimination improves social welfare, ￿rms always
have an incentive to (jointly) switch to the regime of price discrimination from the
regime of uniform pricing.
3.2.1 The Case of Symmetric Product Di⁄erentiation
Let the situation be called symmetric product di⁄erentiation if the normalized
measures of horizontal product di⁄erentiation coincide in the two markets (i.e.,
￿s=￿s = ￿w=￿w). In this case, the two markets are ￿similar￿in the sense that the
only di⁄erence in the two markets is in the intercepts of the inverse demand curves.




s is greater than p￿
w (which comes from the
assumption ￿s > ￿w), the loss in the strong market is always larger than the gain
in the weak market. Thus, in the case of symmetric product di⁄erentiation, social
welfare is never improved by price discrimination (i.e., ￿SW ￿ < 0 for all exogenous
parameters). We therefore need to consider the case of ￿s￿w 6= ￿w￿s, which is called
asymmetric product di⁄erentiation, to study the possibility that ￿SW ￿ > 0.26
3.2.2 The Case of Asymmetric Product Di⁄erentiation
To simplify the analysis, we assume that ￿s = ￿w. By so doing, we are able to focus
on the e⁄ects of (￿s;￿w) on social welfare. More speci￿cally, we allow ￿s and ￿w
to di⁄er, letting ￿ ￿ ￿s = ￿w to avoid unnecessary complications (Appendix A8
gives an analysis with ￿s = ￿w to show the e⁄ects of ￿s = ￿w on social welfare).
We present numerical and graphical arguments on the domains (￿s;￿w) that make
￿SW ￿ > 0 for ￿xed values of (￿w;￿s;￿w).
Figures 4 and 5 depict the region of ￿SW ￿ > 0 (with ￿w = 0:85 for Figure 4 and
25Cowan (2011) also veri￿es this result with linear demands that are not derived from the
representative consumers￿utility functions,
26Note that we do not necessarily assume that the strong market has a larger intercept (￿s > ￿w).
However, Appendix A7 veri￿es that if ￿s = ￿w, price discrimination never improves social welfare.
18￿w = 0:95 for Figure 5) when ￿ = 1:0 (the shaded area).27 Consider ￿rst the case
of substitutable goods (￿s > 0 and ￿w > 0). Remember from Proposition 2 that for
the total social surplus to be improved by price discrimination it is necessary that
￿Q￿ > 0 , ￿s=￿s > ￿w=￿w, that is, ￿s > ￿w in this speci￿cation. Substitutability
in the strong market must be larger than that in the weak market for a welfare
improvement. Remember that the slope of the equilibrium demand in the strong
market ￿(￿s+￿s) is steeper than that in the weak market. This is associated with a
larger increase in output in the weak market rather than a decrease in output in the
strong market. Why is there a bottom right boundary of the region for ￿SW ￿ > 0?
It derives from the restriction that markets s and w are strong and weak markets
respectively: ￿w=￿s < ￿w=￿s(￿;￿) (the details are available upon request). In the
unshaded southeastern area, this inequality does not hold. That is, p￿
s < p￿ < p￿
w
in equilibrium. In other words, markets s and w are actually ￿weak￿and ￿strong￿
markets, respectively. In this area, the substitutability in the actual strong market
(market w) is lower than that in the actual weak market (market s), i.e., ￿w < ￿s.
As mentioned earlier, ￿SW ￿ > 0 only if the actual strong market is more elastic.
Therefore, ￿SW ￿ < 0 in the unshaded southeastern area.
An intuitive explanation for welfare improvement is as follows. The greater the
level of competition is in the weak market, the more welfare gain is expected in the
weak market. This welfare gain in the weak market outweighs the welfare loss in
the strong market when an increase in the discriminatory price in the strong market
is kept low. Thus, competition must be su¢ ciently ￿ercer in the strong market
than in the weak market because the strong market has a larger market size. Note
that the distance between the line ￿w = ￿s and the left-hand side line of the area
where ￿SW ￿ > 0 is wider as ￿w becomes lower. This is because for a low ￿w the
discriminatory price in the weak market is close to the uniform price so that the
welfare gain in this market is small. This ine¢ ciency is greater for a lower value of
￿w. Thus, the level of competition in the strong market that is necessary to o⁄set
27It is veri￿ed that all of the model parameters in the analysis below satisfy the restriction
conditions provided in Appendix A2. Appendix A9 provides ￿gures allowing ￿s and ￿w to be
di⁄erent: one sees no signi￿cant di⁄erences.
19Figure 4: The Region of ￿SW ￿ > 0 for the Case of ￿w = 0:85 and ￿ = 1:0
Figure 5: The Region of ￿SW ￿ > 0 for the Case of ￿w = 0:95 and ￿ = 1:0
20this ine¢ ciency loss is greater.
Notice that price discrimination never improves social welfare in the second
quadrant (￿s < 0 < ￿w). That is, if the two brands are complementary in the strong
market (￿s < 0) while the ￿rms sell substitutable goods in the weak market (￿w > 0),
then price discrimination necessarily deteriorates social welfare. This result seems
to hold for other parameter values because ￿SW ￿ ￿ 0 if ￿s = ￿w and ￿s = ￿w:
in the northwestern region separated by ￿s = ￿w, social welfare would be negative.
The intuitive reason is that complementarity in the strong market makes the price
change caused by discrimination more responsive, which creates more ine¢ ciency,
while substitutability in the weak market makes the price change less responsive.
The latter positive e⁄ect is not su¢ ciently large to outweigh the former negative
e⁄ect.
On the other hand, it is possible that price discrimination improves social wel-
fare if the ￿rms￿ brands are substitutes in the strong market (￿s > 0) and are
complements in the weak market (￿w < 0). Figures 4 and 5 also show that the
combination of a high degree of complementarity in the weak market and a low de-
gree of complementarity in the weak market (i.e., j￿wj larger than j￿sj) is suited to
welfare gain. This result is as expected: strong complementarity in the weak market
keeps the discriminatory price low enough to o⁄set the loss from the price increase
in the strong market. However, it has been veri￿ed that consumer surplus is never
improved by price discrimination (Proposition 1).
Analytical arguments for these results are provided as follows. Fix ￿w 2 (￿1;1),





(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)
(￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)
, ￿s =
￿s[2(￿s ￿ ￿w)￿w ￿ (￿s ￿ 2￿w)￿w]
(2￿s ￿ ￿w)￿w ￿ (￿s ￿ ￿w)￿w
￿ ￿s(￿w;￿;￿).
Substituting ￿s into @￿SW ￿=@￿s, we have:
@￿SW ￿
@￿s
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿s=￿s
< 0,
21Figure 6: Welfare Changes in the Strong and the Weak Markets
which leads to the following proposition (the formal proof is in Appendix A10):
Proposition 2. Fix ￿ and ￿ that satisfy the restrictions stated above. For any
￿w 2 (￿1;1), there exists ￿0
s such that ￿SW ￿ > 0 for ￿s 2 (￿0
s;￿s(￿w;￿;￿)).
In other words, given the values of ￿w and ￿s that satisfy ￿w=￿s(￿;￿) = ￿w=￿s,
a slight decrease in ￿s from ￿s(￿w), keeping ￿w constant, enhances ￿SW ￿. This is
consistent with the result in Figures 4 and 5. In relation to the example in the
Introduction, if an introduction of price discrimination by Coca Cola had triggered
Pepsi to adopt the same strategy, it would have improved social welfare if the degree
of substitution was greater in the resort area (i.e., the strong market) than in the city
area (i.e., the weak market) so that (￿s;￿w) falls into the region where ￿SW ￿ > 0.
This is likely because consumers would care less about the brands if temperature is
high. Another example is when submarkets are grouped by seniority. If the market
for elderly consumers is strong and if they care less about brands, then (￿s;￿w)
satisfy the requirement for welfare improvement.
Figure 6 provides a graphical exposition of Proposition 2. Consider a small de-
crease in ￿s (keeping ￿w constant) from any point (￿s;￿w) that satis￿es ￿w=￿s(￿;￿)
= ￿w=￿s. First, note that ￿s > ￿w. Second, for very small price changes ￿p￿
s and
￿p￿
w caused by the small decrease in ￿s, ￿q￿
w is greater than j￿q￿
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w(p￿)) 0:0150 (3%) 0:0578 (17%)







Table 1: Asymmetric Product Di⁄erentiation (￿w = 0:85 and ￿ = 1:0)
dient in the weak market has a less steep slope. Note that the less ￿m, the gentler
the slope of the ￿virtual￿inverse demand function, pm = ￿m ￿ (￿m + ￿m)qm (see
Subsection 3.1). While the changes in output have ￿rst-order e⁄ects on the welfare
changes, the price changes has second-order e⁄ects (￿p￿
m ￿ ￿q￿
m) and thus can be
ignored. Therefore, when ￿s slightly decreases from any point (￿s;￿w) that satis￿es
￿w=￿s(￿;￿) = ￿w=￿s, price discrimination improves social welfare. This argument
would be applied to non-linear demands.
Next, we focus on one case of asymmetric product di⁄erentiation. Table 1
shows the result for the case of ￿w = 0:85 and ￿s = ￿w = 1:0. The ￿rst case, where
the two brands are substitutes in the strong market while they are complementary
goods in the weak market, has smaller changes in both prices and output than the
second case has. Social welfare is improved by price discrimination in the ￿rst case.
The price di⁄erentials in the latter case are greater: what happens after the regime
change from uniform pricing to price discrimination is that while competition in the
weak market becomes ￿ercer due to substitutability, complementarity softens the
competition to increase discriminatory price in the strong market.
Lastly, we also provide a graphical analysis for ￿￿￿ > 0 (remember that ￿￿￿ >
0 is necessary for ￿SW > 0). Figure 7 depicts the area of ￿￿￿ > 0 when ￿w = 0:85
23and ￿s = ￿w = 1:0. The bottom right boundary comes from, as in Figure 4, the
restriction that markets s and w are strong and weak markets respectively. The
top center boundary is set for both markets to be open under uniform pricing.
Then, where does the left curve come from? Notice that the excluded area roughly
corresponds to ￿￿s < ￿w￿ , which leads to a relatively high discriminatory price in
the strong market. Thus, the strong market is the market where ￿rms want to lower
the price. However, price discrimination ￿forces￿ them to raise the price in the
strong market. Thus, price discrimination makes the ￿rms worse o⁄, and the lower
￿s, the more signi￿cant this negative e⁄ect is.
Figure 7: The Region of ￿￿￿ > 0 for the Case of ￿w = 0:85 and ￿s = ￿w = 1:0
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the relationship between horizontal product di⁄erentiation
and the welfare e⁄ects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly with linear
demands. By deriving linear demands from a representative consumer￿ s utility and
focusing on symmetric equilibrium in a pricing game, we characterize conditions
24relating to such demand properties as substitutability and complementarity for price
discrimination to improve social welfare. More speci￿cally, we derive a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of
substitution must be su¢ ciently greater in the strong market than in the weak
market. It is shown that price discrimination never improves social welfare if ￿rms￿
brands are complements in the strong market and are substitutes in the weak market.
An increase in aggregate output is necessary for welfare improvement. We verify,
however, that consumer surplus is never improved by price discrimination: welfare
improvement by price discrimination is solely the result of an increase in the ￿rms￿
pro￿ts.
In the present paper, we focus only on symmetric equilibrium of the pricing
game to gain analytical insight. In particular, the equilibrium amount of output is
common for all ￿rms under either uniform pricing or price discrimination.28 This
limitation would be particularly unappealing if one wished to compare the equi-
librium predictions from our model with empirical data.29 It is also important to
consider nonlinear demands in oligopoly with price discrimination.30 These and
other interesting issues await future research.
28Galera and Zaratiegui (2006) consider duopolistic third-degree price discrimination with het-
erogeneity in constant marginal cost and show that price discrimination can improve social welfare
even if the total output does not change. This favors the low-cost ￿rm to cut its prices signi￿cantly,
and this cost saving may overcome the welfare losses from price discrimination.
29Recent empirical studies on price discrimination under competition in ￿nal-product markets
include Asplund, Eriksson, and Strand (2008), Grennan (2011) and Hendel and Nevo (2011).
30See, e.g., Weyl and Fabinger (2009), Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010), and Cowan (2012)
for recent advances in the study of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination with nonlinear
demands.
25Appendices
A1. Changes in Equilibrium Prices and Quantities by Price
Discrimination






(2￿m ￿ ￿m)(￿m + ￿m)
,
where the denominator is positive because j￿mj < ￿m.
Under uniform pricing, if both markets are open (see Appendix A2 for the ver-




(￿m ￿ ￿m)(￿m0 ￿ ￿m0)[￿m(￿m0 + ￿m0) + ￿m0(￿m + ￿m)]
￿U ; (A1)





m)(2￿m0 ￿ ￿m0). The
denominator and the numerator are also found to be positive because j￿mj < ￿m.
One can verify that the equilibrium quantities under uniform pricing in market m 6=

























m)[￿m(￿m ￿ ￿m)(2￿m0 ￿ ￿m0) ￿ ￿m0(￿m0 ￿ ￿m0)(2￿m ￿ ￿m)]
(2￿m ￿ ￿m)￿U
be de￿ned as the changes in the equilibrium prices resulting from a move uniform
pricing to price discrimination in each market. Thus, if we de￿ne the strong (weak)
market as that where the equilibrium price increases (decreases) by price discrimi-
nation, then market m is strong if and only if
￿m >
(￿m0 ￿ ￿m0)(2￿m ￿ ￿m)
(￿m ￿ ￿m)(2￿m0 ￿ ￿m0)
￿m0.
This implies that, in contrast to the case of monopoly with inter-market dependen-
cies (see Adachi (2002)), the condition on the intercepts, ￿m > ￿m0, is not exactly
26the necessary and su¢ cient condition for market m to be strong: if ￿m0￿m is much
larger than ￿m￿m0 (note that either or both can be negative), then market m with
￿m > ￿m0 can be weak. Of course, if ￿m = ￿m0 and ￿m = ￿m0, then ￿m > ￿m0 is the
necessary and su¢ cient condition for market m to be strong.








(￿m ￿ ￿m)[￿m(￿m ￿ ￿m)(2￿m0 ￿ ￿m0) ￿ ￿m0(￿m0 ￿ ￿m0)(2￿m ￿ ￿m)]
(2￿m ￿ ￿m)￿U :
as the equilibrium changes in output resulting from a more from uniform pricing
to price discrimination for each ￿rm in strong and weak markets, respectively. It is
then veri￿ed that ￿p￿
m and ￿q￿
m are related in the following way:
￿p
￿
m = ￿(￿m + ￿m)￿q
￿
m, (A4)
so that we have qm(p￿
m) > qm(p￿) if and only if p￿
m < p￿. One can also derive the







(￿w￿s ￿ ￿s￿w)[￿s(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w) ￿ ￿w(￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)]
(2￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)￿U ,
which does not necessarily coincides with zero, as opposed to the case of monopoly
with linear demands.
Now, although market m is strong even if ￿m = ￿m0 as long as (￿m￿￿m)(2￿m0￿
￿m0) > (￿m0 ￿ ￿m0)(2￿m ￿ ￿m), we assume that ￿m 6= ￿m0. This is because if













and most importantly, ￿SW ￿, the di⁄erence in social welfare under price discrim-
ination and under uniform pricing (introduced in Section 3), can never be positive
(the formal proof is upon request). Thus, unequal values of intercepts of the two
markets are necessary for price discrimination to improve social welfare. Hence, for
27markets s and w to be strong and weak, respectively, it is necessary for the weak
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The reason why this is not a su¢ cient condition is that we must verify the parameter
restrictions for market w to be su¢ ciently large to be open under uniform pricing.
We verify them in Appendix A2.
For later use (Appendix A3), we also calculate the sum of a ￿rm￿ s output under











A2. Market Opening under Uniform Pricing
Remember that the symmetric equilibrium under uniform pricing in the main text
and Appendix A1 is obtained, given that both markets are supplied by either ￿rm
under uniform pricing (qs(p￿) > 0 and qw(p￿) > 0). In this appendix, we obtain
a (su¢ cient) condition guaranteeing that in equilibrium each ￿rm supplies to the
weak market under uniform pricing. To do so, we consider one ￿rm￿ s incentive not
to deviate from the equilibrium by stopping its supply to the weak market.
Suppose ￿rm j supplies only to the strong market, given that the rival ￿rm
supplies both markets with the equilibrium price, p￿ (see Appendix A1). Let ￿rm
j￿ s price when deviating from the equilibrium price under the uniform pricing regime
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00).
Note that ￿rm j￿ s pro￿t function when it deviates to any price other than the
equilibrium price would not necessarily be (globally) concave because it would be
kinked at the threshold price where the weak market closes, as depicted in Figure 8.
If p00 attains the local maximum as in Panels (1) and (2) in Figure 8, then one
needs to solve for the restriction on the set of parameters guaranteeing that the















It is, however, too complicated to obtain the set of parameters from this in-
equality. Thus, we instead focus on the case that corresponds to Panel (3) in Figure
8. This gives a su¢ cient condition for the weak market to open. Notice that by
31Given p￿, the upper bound of p0 such that qj
s(p0;p￿) ￿ 0 is larger than that such that
qj
w(p0;p￿) ￿ 0 if and only if ￿s > (￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)￿w=((￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)). That is, for any
p0 such that qj
w(p0;p￿) ￿ 0, qj
s(p0;p￿) ￿ 0. In other words, given p￿, the strong market opens if the
weak market does. The upper bound of p0 such that qj
s(p0;p￿) ￿ 0 is ((￿s ￿￿s)￿s +￿sp￿)=￿s. The
upper bound of p0 such that qj
w(p0;p￿) ￿ 0 is ((￿w ￿ ￿w)￿w + ￿wp￿)=￿w. The former minus the
latter is















29Figure 8: Pro￿t when Deviating from the Equilibrium Price under Uniform Pricing
30de￿nition, p00 must satisfy qj
w(p00;p￿) ￿ 0, given p￿. If this is violated, then it is the
case of Panel (3) in Figure 8. It shortens to
￿w >
(￿s ￿ ￿s)[2(￿w ￿ ￿w)(￿
2
w ￿ ￿2




(￿w ￿ ￿w)[2(2￿s ￿ ￿s)(￿
2
w ￿ ￿2





Together with the argument in Appendix A1, throughout the paper, we assume
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These restrictions are su¢ cient for markets s and w to be actually strong and weak
and to be open under uniform pricing.
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31A4. ￿Q￿ ￿ 0 ) ￿SW￿ < 0
Using the explicit forms for ￿p￿
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Y ￿ [￿s(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w) ￿ ￿w(￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)];





s)(3￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)
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w)(4￿s￿w ￿ 4￿s￿w + 2￿s￿w ￿ ￿s￿w + ￿s￿w)]





s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)(4￿s￿w ￿ 4￿w￿s + 2￿s￿w ￿ ￿w￿s + ￿s￿w)






Both Y and Z are decreasing in ￿w. Remember from Appendix A2 that
￿w < min
￿
￿s(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)




32and it is veri￿ed that
min
￿
￿s(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)





￿s if and only if ￿ ￿s￿w + ￿s￿w > 0,
￿s(￿s￿￿s)(2￿w￿￿w)
(￿w￿￿w)(2￿s￿￿s) otherwise.
If Y and Z are positive for any ￿w that satis￿es the above inequality, ￿CS￿ is
negative.
First, if ￿￿s￿w + ￿s￿w > 0, the upper bound of ￿w is ￿s. If Y and Z are














w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿s￿w + (￿w ￿ ￿w)￿s)]:
Both Y and Z are positive. This implies that ￿CS￿ is negative.
Second, if ￿￿s￿w + ￿s￿w < 0, the upper bound of ￿w is ￿s(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿
￿w)=((￿w￿￿w)(2￿s￿￿s)). If Y and Z are non-negative for ￿w = ￿s(￿s￿￿s)(2￿w￿
￿w)=((￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)), Y and Z are positive for any ￿w. When ￿w = ￿s(￿s ￿
￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)=((￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)), Y and Z are
Y = 0;










Y is zero and Z is positive. This implies that ￿CS￿ < 0 for ￿w < ￿s(￿s￿￿s)(2￿w￿
￿w)=((￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)).
A6. ￿Q￿ > 0 ) ￿￿￿ > 0
It is veri￿ed that ￿￿￿ > 0 if and only if
￿w
￿s














































w + ￿s(￿2￿w + ￿w)
2)].
The di⁄erence between the right hand side and the upper bound for ￿w=￿s,
min
￿
(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)


















































w + ￿s(￿2￿w + ￿w)
2)]
￿
(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)
(￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)
,
which is positive if and only if ￿w￿s ￿￿s￿w > 0. That is, if ￿s=￿s ￿￿w=￿w > 0, the
upper bound of ￿w=￿s such that ￿￿￿ is positive is larger than
min
￿
(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)





(￿s ￿ ￿s)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)
(￿w ￿ ￿w)(2￿s ￿ ￿s)
is decreasing in ￿s. This expression takes value 1 when ￿s = ￿s￿w=￿w. Therefore,
this is smaller than 1 when ￿s=￿s > ￿w=￿w.
A7. ￿SW￿ ￿ 0 for ￿m = ￿m0
We can proceed as follows:
￿SW
￿ =
(￿w + ￿w)(p￿2 ￿ p￿
s
2) + (￿s + ￿s)(p￿2 ￿ p￿
w
2)
(￿s + ￿s)(￿w + ￿w)
= ￿
(￿w + ￿w)(p￿ + p￿
s)￿p￿
s + (￿s + ￿s)(p￿ + p￿
w)￿p￿
w

















(￿w + ￿w)(2￿w ￿ ￿w)￿U
34= ￿
￿m(￿s￿w ￿ ￿w￿s)














































































































It is easy to see that the equality holds if and only if ￿s￿w ￿ ￿w￿s = 0.
A8. Welfare Analysis when ￿m is Common
Let ￿ ￿ ￿s = ￿w. We allow ￿s and ￿w to di⁄er and provide numerical analysis
to contrast substitutability with complementarity for a ￿xed value of (￿w;￿s;￿w),
and graphical arguments on the domains (￿s;￿w) for ￿SW ￿ > 0, with the value of
(￿;￿w) ￿xed.
Table 2 shows the result for the case of ￿w = 0:85. The ￿rst and the sec-
ond column corresponds to the case of substitutability (￿ = 0:3), while the third
and the fourth correspond to the case of complementarity (￿ = ￿0:3). The dif-
ference between the ￿rst and the second (the third and the fourth in the case of
35(￿;￿s;￿w) =
(0:3;1:0;0:75) (0:3;0:75;1:0) (￿0:3;1:0;0:75) (￿0:3;0:75;1:0)
p￿ 0:3582 0:3644 0:5235 0:5423
p￿
s (￿p￿
s=p￿) 0:4118 (15%) 0:3750 (3%) 0:5652 (8%) 0:5833 (8%)
p￿
w (￿p￿








w(p￿)) 0:0375 (8%) 0:0111 (3%) 0:0615 (8%) 0:0884 (20%)
￿SW ￿ ￿0:0063 0:0005 ￿0:0022 ￿0:0123
￿CS￿
s ￿0:0507 ￿0:0127 ￿0:0543 ￿0:0797
￿CS￿
w 0:0384 0:0109 0:0419 0:0598
￿￿￿ 0:0060 0:0023 0:0102 0:0076
￿Q￿ ￿0:0037 0:0009 0:0019 ￿0:0028
Table 2: Substitutability versus Complementarity with ￿s 6= ￿w (￿w = 0:85)
complementarity) columns is whether the own slope of the inverse demand curve
in the strong market is greater than that in the weak market (i.e., ￿s > ￿w).
Notice that price discrimination improves social welfare only in the second case
((￿;￿s;￿w) = (0:3;0:75;1:0)). In this case, j￿q￿
sj=q￿
s(p￿) is particularly small (2%),
while ￿q￿
w=q￿
w(p￿), is also not too large (3%), in comparison with the other three
cases.
First, consider the case of substitutable goods (￿ > 0). Notice that when ￿s >
￿w, the strong market has a higher value of price elasticity than the weak market (see
equation (4)). The equilibrium price in the strong market p￿
s, however, is at a higher
level than in the case of ￿s < ￿w (0:4118 vs. 0:3750). This seemingly paradoxical
result is due to strategic e⁄ects: the ￿rms want to ￿cooperate￿because they are
afraid of retaliation when the market is more price elastic. Now, if the market is
￿integrated￿(i.e., uniform pricing is forced), then the market price in the strong
market is expected to drop to a larger extent than in the case of ￿s < ￿w, because
the strong market has a higher value of price elasticity (it is more competitive) than
the weak market when ￿s > ￿w. In Table 2, we see the price in the strong market
drop from 0.4118 to 0.3582 (￿6%) when (￿;￿s;￿w) = (0:3;1;0:75), while ps drops
from 0.3750 to 0.3644 (￿3%) when (￿;￿s;￿w) = (0:3;0:75;1:0). To summarize,
when the strong market is less price elastic, the regime of uniform pricing does not
36lower the price in the strong market su¢ ciently. As a result, uniform pricing may
harm social welfare. In other words, price discrimination may improve welfare.
Even though the products are complements, a similar logic can apply to the
property of price discrimination. When the products are complements, the price
changes and the associated production changes are large due to the greater elasticity
created by complementarity. In fact, welfare loss is larger in the fourth case (where
the strong market has a higher value of price elasticity than the weak market does)
than in the third case (j ￿ 0:0123] > j ￿ 0:0022j). As to the changes in equilibrium
aggregate output, it is positive in our second and third cases but negative in the other
two. These results are consistent with Proposition 2: an increase in the aggregate
output is necessary for welfare to be improved by price discrimination, as in the case
of monopoly.
The di⁄erence between substitutability and complementarity is further investi-
gated graphically. Figures 9 and 10 depict the region of ￿SW ￿ > 0 for the cases
of substitutability (￿ = 0:3) and of complementarity (￿ = ￿0:3), respectively (with
￿w = 0:85). Notice that (￿s;￿w) = (0:75;1:0) in Table 2 is contained in the shaded
region of Figure 9. The result for the case of substitutability is expected from the
argument above. For the case of complementarity, the combination of ￿high ￿s and
low ￿w￿works for welfare improvement, the reverse of the situation in the case of
substitutability. Notice that complementarity makes the demand in each market
more price elastic. With elasticity already su¢ ciently high, a higher value of ￿s
raises the uniform price, and thus the price change introduced by price discrimina-
tion is reduced because of the high value of ￿s, reducing the ine¢ ciency of price
discrimination in the strong market.
In Figure 9, the white area around the top right corner violates the condition
that ￿s=￿w > ￿s=￿w. The violation means that the discriminatory price in the
strong market with ￿s is lower than that in the weak market with ￿w (note that
￿s > ￿w). In other words, the discriminatory price at the market with a higher
intercept (￿s) is lower than that in the market with a lower intercept (￿w). Following
the de￿nition of a ￿strong￿market in Section 2, we now rede￿ne the former as the
37Figure 9: Substitutability (￿ = 0:3) in the Case of ￿w = 0:85
Figure 10: Complementarity (￿ = ￿0:3) in the Case of ￿w = 0:85
38￿weak market￿and the latter as the ￿strong￿market.￿On this white area where
￿s < ￿w holds, the rede￿ned ￿weak￿market with a higher intercept is more elastic
than the rede￿ned ￿strong￿market with a lower intercept. As mentioned above,
when the ￿weak￿market is elastic, the increase in quantity in the weak market is
not high enough to o⁄set the loss from the decrease in quantity in the strong market;
that is, ￿Q < 0. In fact, in this white area, price discrimination deteriorates the
total social surplus.
Lastly, it is veri￿ed that consumer surplus is never improved by price discrimi-
nation in the cases of (￿;￿w) = (0:3;0:85) and of (￿;￿w) = (￿0:3;0:85). Thus, this
and other numeral results suggest that welfare improvement from price discrimina-
tion is solely due to an increase in the ￿rms￿pro￿ts. In particular, it means that
there is little or no chance that ￿rms will su⁄er from ￿prisoners￿dilemma￿ ; that
is, ￿rms are mostly or always better by switching from uniform pricing to price
discrimination.
A9. Areas of Welfare Improvement when ￿s 6= ￿w
Figures 11 and 12 depict the region of ￿SW ￿ > 0 (with ￿w = 0:95) for the case of
￿s = 1:2 and ￿w = 1:0 (Figure 11) and for the case of ￿s = 1:0 and ￿w = 1:2.
A10. Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting ￿s into @￿SW ￿=@￿s, we have
@￿SW ￿
@￿s
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿s=￿s
= ￿
2(￿s ￿ ￿w)￿w(￿w ￿ ￿w)[￿s￿w + (￿s ￿ ￿w)(￿w ￿ ￿w)]3
￿s￿s(2￿w ￿ ￿w)3M
where
M = (2￿w ￿ ￿w)(￿w + ￿w)￿
2
s
+￿s￿wf2￿s(2￿w ￿ ￿w) ￿ (￿w ￿ ￿w)(￿w + ￿w)g ￿ 3￿s￿
2
w(￿w ￿ ￿w)
Notice that ￿s > ￿w, ￿w > ￿w, ￿s￿w+(￿s￿￿w)(￿w￿￿w) > 0, and 2￿w￿￿w. It can
be shown that M is a concave function of ￿w. For ￿w 2 [0;￿s], this function is locally
39Figure 11: The Region of ￿SW ￿ > 0 for the Case of ￿w = 0:95, ￿s = 1:2 and
￿w = 1:0
Figure 12: The Region of ￿SW ￿ > 0 for the Case of ￿w = 0:95, ￿s = 1:0 and
￿w = 1:2
40maximized at ￿w = 0 or ￿w = ￿s. When ￿w = 0, M = (2￿w ￿￿w)(￿w +￿w)￿2
s > 0.
When ￿w = ￿s, M = ￿2
s(￿s + ￿w)(￿w + ￿w) > 0. Therefore,
@￿SW ￿
@￿s
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿s=￿s
< 0.
Thus, there exists ￿0
s such that ￿SW ￿ > 0 for ￿s 2 (￿0
s;￿s).
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44Additional Appendices (Not for Publication)
Restrictions on ￿w=￿s in Figure 4
Assume that ￿s = 1:0, ￿w = 0:85, and ￿s = ￿w = 1:0. Then, the regions (￿s;￿w)
that satisfy ￿w=￿s > ￿s=￿w(￿;￿) and ￿w=￿s < ￿w=￿s(￿;￿) are respectively drawn
in Figures AA 1 and AA 2. One can see that ￿w=￿s = ￿w=￿s(￿;￿) binds for
￿SW ￿ > 0.
Figure AA 1: The weak market must
be large enough:
￿w=￿s > ￿s=￿w(￿;￿)
Figure AA 2: The weak market must
be small enough:
￿w=￿s < ￿w=￿s(￿;￿)
45Numerical Calculation (Tables 1 and 2)
We use Mathematica to obtain numerical results. For the case of symmetric product







Table AA 1: q￿
s(p￿), q￿
w(p￿) and ￿Q￿ with ￿s = ￿w = 1:0 (￿w = 0:85)
The following table is for Table 2.
(￿;￿s;￿w) =
(0:3;1;0:75) (0:3;0:75;1:0) (￿0:3;1:0;0:75) (￿0:3;0:75;1:0)
q￿
s(p￿) 0:4937 0:6053 0:6807 1:0171
q￿
w(p￿) 0:4684 0:3735 0:7255 0:4396
Table AA 2: q￿
s(p￿), q￿
w(p￿) and ￿Q￿ with ￿s 6= ￿w (￿w = 0:85)
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